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The Common Thread in
Kuyper, Kuhn and Cognitive
Psychology: Interpretive
Frameworks

by Daniel Hitchcock
“We see and understand things not as they
are but as we are.” ~Anthony de Mello—
Awareness (1990)

Christian mystic Anthony de Mello illustrates
today’s postmodern view of reality. He seems to
say that truth and reality are autonomous, subjective constructions in the eye of the beholder.
Thus, Truth claims cannot be judged as true in
all contexts for all times but are relative to some
frame of reference like personal perception, lanDr. Daniel F. A. Hitchcock is Associate Professor of
Psychology at the College of Arts and Sciences at Regent
University, Virginia Beach, Virginia.
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guage, or culture.
The idea that subjectivity influences the way
we interpret the world is not new; neither is the
idea that subjective factors influence the methods, discoveries, and applications of human collective efforts. Over the last half-century, the
bastion of objective reason has been crumbling at
its Enlightenment foundation. Fatal blows have
come from insights in psychology and the philosophy of science. Although modern positivistic science has been mortally wounded, I believe
an integrative approach can be taken between a
strong relativistic position on truth and an absolutist one. The Christian faith as a worldview legitimizes the assertion that there is a “real world”
as well as the belief that we perceive it through
interpretive lenses, which I will be calling “interpretive frameworks.” These frameworks can yield
a plurality of views, including imperfect ones.
The goal of this paper is to explore the conflict between the relativistic and absolutist positions on truth, using insights from cognitive psychology, philosophy of science, and Christianity.
First, I will highlight how subjectivity takes
place at the level of the individual, as described
by schema theory. Second, I will show that the
same cognitive process lies at the heart of human
social efforts via shared interpretive frameworks
often called “paradigms.” And third, I will address the glaring implication of such subjectiv-

plain a variety of phenomena—especially in
ity. If individuals and groups interpret the world
memory research and cognitive development. The
via their own subjective frameworks, the result is
result has been a theory explaining that subjective
relativism, which is antithetical to objective abinterpretive frameworks are used to see and undersolute truth that stands firm across all times and
stand the world. Today we call this theory “schecontexts. I will argue that Christian worldview
ma theory,” the name originating from Kant.3
philosophy helps resolve the apparent conflict
based upon the biblical insight that the way we
Over the last century, key European psycholosee and understand realgists, including Frederick
ity stems ultimately from
Bartlett and Jean Piaget,
Although modern positivistic
the condition of our heart.
have articulated and apInterpretive frameworks
plied this idea. Bartlett conscience has been mortally
are fundamental to human
cluded that memory is a rewounded, I believe an
nature, and embracing
construction of interaction
integrative approach can
their role in human funcwith the environment that
be taken between a strong
tioning poses no threat to
involves pre-set schemata
relativistic position on truth
a biblical view of truth and
or frameworks that guide
reality.
both memory storage and
and an absolutist one.
recall.4 Piaget took the idea
Individual Subjectivity:
of interpretive frameworks
Cognitive Schema Theory
beyond memory processing and articulated an enAt the heart of schema theory is the relative
tire theory of cognitive development based upon
nature of human sensory perception. The claim
their role in organizing all experience.5
that the process of perception is not an exact
When the “cognitive revolution” took place
match of the original sensation from the external
in American psychology in the late 1960s,6 the
world originates with Immanuel Kant.1 This idea
mantle was taken up by many, including Ulrich
Neisser, who speculated that mental cognitive
was given experimental support in the late 1800s
schemata result from actual physical processes in
by the founder of psychology, Wilhelm Wundt,
the nervous system.7
who researched psychophysics in Germany.2 For
example, I use this demonstration to illustrate
Schema theory has even been explanatory in
how perception is relative. I place two buckets of
the research areas of artificial intelligence, neural
water in front of the class, one with ice. I ask a
network theory, and neuroscience, by theorists
volunteer willing to get his or her hand wet, to
including Michael Arbib.8 Arbib believes that
rate, on a scale of 1 to 10, the temperature of the
schema theory is the best explanation for going
bucket without ice. This contains cold tap water,
beyond the structure of the brain to an underand the student usually rates it as a 3 or 4. Next,
standing of the function of it.9
I have the student rate the ice water—using the
In recent decades, many researchers have consame hand—which usually receives an emphatic
firmed that schemata serve as frameworks that
rating of 1! I then instruct the student to quickly
guide interpretation. This confirmation has been
put his or her hand back into first bucket and rate
shown in domains such as story recall,10 text comthe water anew. The student surprisingly says, “It
prehension, and speed of recall,11 linguistics,12
feels like a 6 or 7.” This response reveals that pervisual learning,13 cultural differences in cogniception is relative and is more dependent upon
tion,14 computational cognition,15 and problem
the current skin temperature than upon the temsolving16 and has been applied widely in various
perature of the stimulus. The point is that, at an
disciplines, including education.17
individual level, we are bound by an interpretaThe work by Wundt, Bartlett, Piaget, Neisser
tion process that is relative to individual experiand Arbib shows how our cognition is an inherence.
ently subjective process. It is the interplay of an
Over the years this idea has been used to exindividual’s sensation and perception and the rePro Rege—March 2018
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ality of his or her environment. However, the role
of interpretive frameworks does not end here at
the individual level, but it extends to how meaning is shared and understood collectively. The
same cognitive process lies at the core of human
social efforts. Shared interpretive frameworks
function in ways that yield collective subjectivity.
Collective Subjectivity
Humans are social creatures, dependent upon
the structures of family, society, and culture.
Given this social dependency, it makes sense that
the use of interpretive frameworks would have a
social counterpart seen in groups.
The idea was anticipated first in the 1930s by
Lev Vygotsky’s sociocultural view of cognition.
Vygotsky claimed inter-dependence between
individual cognition and the social context in
which it takes place.18 This view, that a type of
collective interpretive framework guides group or
social functioning, has been articulated in disciplines beyond the social sciences, most notably in
the history and philosophy of science.
Over the last half-century, much investigation has looked at the social structure of science.
The findings have underscored the role of subjectivity in scientific activity, in contrast to the
modernist mindset, which sees science as a purely
objective endeavor. The overarching consensus of
this work has been that groups of scientists function under a type of conceptual structure that
orients their work. This structure is subject to
non-science-related influences, such as aesthetics,
persuasion, and personalities. Although there is
controversy as to who should get credit for the
originality of some of his concepts,19 none can
deny that Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions20 has been one of the most
important works published on the topic in the
last half-century.21
Human Science Guided by Paradigms
Kuhn articulated a new way for understanding scientific progress. He argued that a linear
progression of discovery upon discovery—accumulating objective knowledge—was insufficient for describing how science actually works.
He proposed a model describing science as un16
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predictable and irregular. Rather than a vertical,
linear process, he suggested more of a horizontal
one of skips and jumps within a single plane, motivated not by anything objective but by subjective, socially-driven factors, such as personality,
prestige, and aesthetics. He even used the religious term of “faith” and the metaphor of “conversion” to describe how an individual scientist
jumps allegiance from one view to another.
Kuhn’s basic concept for describing science
centers on the notion of a paradigm. A paradigm is a collective conceptual framework that
includes a complicated mixture of assumptions,
theories, and hypotheses accepted by the group
that establish a type of unconscious perimeter
within which scientific investigation takes place.
Progress is better seen as growth in depth rather
than growth in breadth. Science is like digging
a well straight down within a defined perimeter.
Although not always known by those working in it, the perimeter of the paradigm is limited. Nature, however, is not so limited; therefore,
some discoveries do not fit within the boundaries of the tight-knit paradigm. Someone digging
near the edge may accidentally dig beyond the
boundary. Kuhn calls such findings “anomalies.”
They are often ignored and swept under the rug
by those who discover them—unless they recur
enough to create a crisis within the paradigm: a
state of tension for anomalies that can no longer
be ignored. When the paradigm can no longer
provide a comprehensive explanatory framework,
that paradigm must give way to another paradigm in order to accommodate the new data.
This giving way shifts the discipline to a completely different and seemingly incompatible
paradigm. Kuhn calls this change a “paradigm
shift,” or a “revolution”—a process of demolition
and reconstruction—in contrast to the traditional modernist view of gradual, vertical, linear, and
harmonious progress.
Kuhn points to a gestalt switch (like a 3D
Necker cube drawing) as an analogy to describe
this process, where a single set of data can be
perceived in two completely different ways—but
only one way at a time. Kuhn’s description underscores the idea that humans are subjective in
their collective interpretation of even scientific

world.
Looking closely, however, we find that neither view negates reality itself. Rather than seeing these conflicting paradigms as supporting the
Frameworks Do Not Yield Relativism
idea that reality is only in the eye of the beholder,
So far, we have seen two similar descriptions
we should conclude that the interpretation of reof how humans understand and experience the
ality is what is in the eye of the beholder. This latworld, both individually and collectively—via
ter statement more clearly highlights the role of
individual and shared interpretive frameworks:
our imperfect perception and cognition as they
cognitive structures of belief and expectations
interact with the real world, rather than claiming
that guide the interpretation of reality. Each dethat reality itself is malleable.
scription highlights subjectivity in contrast to the
Our view should be
objectivity of traditional
that a real world exists,
modernism.
Correctly understood,
and that experiences, based
The subjective and noninterpretive frameworks, such
firmly in that real world,
cumulative process disas schemata and paradigms,
can nonetheless be intercussed by Kuhn, and also
are each quite compatible with
preted and understood difby others such as Polanyi22
objective, absolute reality.
ferently, given the particuin the 1960s, took direct
lar framework (i.e., schema
aim at modernism’s objecor paradigm). John Searle articulates a similar
tive impartiality and began, in part, to usher in
view. He presents a satisfying alternative to the
post modernity. The knee-jerk reaction by many
old modernist view as well as to the prevailing
in science, as well as in Christianity, has been to
postmodern constructionist and deconstructionresist the sea change to postmodernism. Some
ist views, which both deny any ultimate realhave critiqued this change as relativism and antiity.24 Searle suggests that two types of facts exscience.23 Christians have resisted such new ideas
too because of the danger of runaway relativism.
ist: “brute” facts, which are independent of what
Such a view seems to undermine the Christian
humans think about them (such as that Mount
conviction of absolute truth’s flowing from an
Everest has snow), and “social” facts, which are
almighty sovereign God, who is objectively real.
humanly constructed and conceived individually
Granted, the views presented allow for relaor institutionally (such as a piece of paper is a $5
tive interpretation by individuals and groups,
bill). This position affirms that which cognitive
but I believe that neither should be classified as
schema theory and philosophers of science, like
endorsing postmodern relativism, which denies
Kuhn, contend: that a true reality exists and that
the existence of absolute truth. Correctly underhumans develop interpretive frameworks with
stood, interpretive frameworks, such as schemata
which they interpret that reality.
and paradigms, are each quite compatible with
objective, absolute reality.
Illusory Schema Conflict:
When relativity is an illusion
Schemata: Basis For Relativity?
One important point to highlight is that
Taking the ideas from cognitive psychology
sometimes what looks like relativism is only an
or philosophy of science to an extreme, we find
illusion. Regarding the function of schemata as
that it does look like postmodern relativism. Yes,
they guide individual understanding, I see two
human perceptual systems “construct” an underaspects of the process that can yield what I term
standing of the world that does not always match
“illusory schema conflict.” The first deals with
reality. Yes, humans mentally construct schemata
multiple exemplars of a single concept, while the
that guide perception. Yes, collective thinking or
other draws attention to the possibility of mulparadigms seem to be exclusively mind-depentiple interpretations of a single exemplar.
dent and subjective—apart from the objective
Let me illustrate the first with the tallest
facts, guided by a collective interpretive framework.
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mountain question. If I asked, “What is the tallest mountain on Earth?” most would say Mount
Everest in Nepal and China—it stands over
29,000 feet above sea level. However, is Mount
Everest really the tallest mountain on Earth? If
we invoke different schemata to define the concept of “tallest mountain,” there can be a plurality of correct answers:
• Tallest from its base below sea level (under water): Mauna Kea in Hawaii, 33,480
feet.
• Tallest rising from ocean floor: Mount
Lamlam, Guam, 37,820 feet from the
Mariana Trench
• Tallest from center of the earth: Mount
Chimborazo in Ecuador, over 20 million
feet.
The use of different schemata underscores
the role of definition and context. Interpersonal
misunderstandings are often caused by this type
of schema conflict. Two different interpretive
frameworks are correctly used, but they come
to disparate conclusions. These differences show
that sometimes differences may be due not to
whether someone is wrong or right but simply to
the fact that more than one point of view is viable.
The second type of schema conflict occurs
when differing schemata are derived honestly
from a single exemplar. An illustration of this is
the ancient parable from India about six blind
men walking who encounter an obstacle in their
path. As each reaches out to touch what is in his
way, the six have an awful argument because
none can agree on what it is. One says it’s a spear,
another says it is a hose, while yet another claims
it is a fan. The fourth declares it is a wall, but
another claims it is a pillar, and the last is convinced it is a rope with a brush on its end. What
they have encountered? The moral derived is that
there are many ways to describe an elephant and
that individual perception is limited. Some argue
that this parable illustrates relativity—that each
man experienced his own truth, valid for him
and not the others. However, I suggest a more
cryptic meaning. Yes, each man’s framework was
different from that of the others, but the six views
actually come together to form a more complete
18
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whole.
This way of looking at the story highlights
a distinction between the two types of schema
conflict. The first, illustrated by the mountain
story, affirms the multiplicity of truth, mediated
by context, while the elephant story shows that a
grand truth may lie behind multiple interpretations. This latter example emphasizes how seemingly differing views may actually come together
to provide a more complete understanding. The
apostle Paul makes a similar point in Romans
and I Corinthians when he explains that although there are many separate parts of the body,
they function together as a whole.25 This principle applies not only to the physical body and the
Church of Jesus Christ but also to human cognitive function.
In both cases of illusory schema conflict, the
conflict seems to reveal incompatible ways of understanding when, in actuality, the conflicting
schemata or views can be shown to be simultaneously totally true.
This raises the question of whether we, individually or collectively, are capable of seeing beyond our own interpretive frameworks to perceive
the whole. No doubt, this perception of the whole
might be possible, but probably not in all circumstances because we have been created with limits: normative limits imposed simply by the fact
that we are created creatures and by the intrusion
and distortion of sin.26 Both types of limitations
probably play a role in obstructing our view of the
whole. I speculate that some portions of our limited view, specifically those due to the distortion
of sin, are potentially fixable, or at least partially,
via sanctification; but post-consummation, some
of these limits will be entirely gone, and we will
experience knowledge of the true-for-all-time,
uber-framework.
An Uber-framework?
An uber-framework is the idea that there exists an overarching metanarrative that gives ultimate meaning to varying and sometimes seemingly disparate cultural and/or individual narratives. Several Christian scholars have argued
for the existence of such a superior framework.27
For example, Roy Clouser makes a case for an

edge and Truth and that the Bible is a direct filter
overarching framework that subsumes both pure
for Truth. Kuyper believed that people can and
Aristotelian objectivity and Kantian subjectivity
should understand Christianity as a holistic and
and provides a third alternative: that ultimate
comprehensive philosophy of life rather than as
knowledge lies with God alone. Clouser suggests
just one compartmental aspect of human experithat there exists an overarching uber-framework,
ence.31, 32
albeit in the mind of God alone, that subsumes
28
all others.
This is where Kuyper highlights worldview as a type of interpretive framework. The
This idea has been articulated by many in the
term itself is translated from the German word
context of worldview philosophy, particularly by
Weltanschauung, which means “a particular way
Christians who believe that in God lies ultimate
of looking at the world.” The term originates
truth, or the true worldview of worldviews—the
with Kant, as we saw with
uber-framework. In my
the term schema.33 Since his
judgment, the concept
An uber-framework is the idea
paradigm that we have
that there exists an overarching time, it has come to mean
described thus far in the
a set of underlying assumpmetanarrative that gives
context of the philosophy
tions that define the spirit
ultimate meaning to varying
of science is identical in
of the age or the particular
and sometimes seemingly
essence and function with
way a culture manifests itthe concept of worldview
self in literature, art, philosdisparate cultural and/or
that has been articulated
ophy, and science. Kuyper
individual narratives.
by many Christian phiused the term to suggest
losophers.
that multiple worldviews
can co-exist and be in conflict with one another
Christian Worldview Philosophy
while competing for people’s allegiance.
In David Naugle’s in-depth look at the conIn his day, Kuyper identified two opposcept of worldview, he traces the idea of an overing “faiths,” or worldviews, that were in direct
arching worldview that explains all reality—back
conflict: modernism versus Christianity. Kuyper
to the Reformation writings of John Calvin and
suggested that the conflict resulted ultimately
then, in the late 1800s, to Scottish theologian
from Adam and Eve’s fall in to sin. The Fall proJames Orr and Dutch theologian Abraham
duced an antithesis, or tension between God and
Kuyper.29 As the more well-known of these two,
idolatry (or evil), that is manifested in all human
endeavors. Relating this antithesis to science, for
Kuyper’s version will be described briefly.
example, Naugle states,
Kuyperian Worldview Philosophy
Kuyper argues [that]… regenerate people
Kuyper is known for applying Calvinism to
with a Christian worldview produce a … theeveryday life, focusing on the sovereignty of the
istic interpretation of science, and non-regenGod of the Bible over all aspects of reality: coserate people with a non-Christian worldview
mos, culture and thought. Calvin believed that
produce an idolatrous science …. Scientific
God revealed Himself to humans via the created
reason is not the same for all people. It deorder, as well as through the Bible, the infallible
pends upon whether or not the scientist has
and inerrant words written under the influence of
or has not been religiously renewed. There
the Holy Spirit. Of these two revelations, Calvin
is not a neutral scientific rationality leading
gave priority to the Bible when he used the metato certain objective and shared conclusions.
Instead, scientific theories are a function of
phor of the Scriptures being spectacles through
the religious backgrounds and philosophical
which humans are to interpret and understand
30
orientations of the scientists or theorists.34
the rest of God’s creation. In other words,
Calvin claimed that God, as sovereign creator
It is important to point out that the conflict
of all things, is the ultimate source of all knowlis not in the science itself but in the conclusions
Pro Rege—March 2018
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made (i.e., interpretation and application).
Kuyper is basically arguing that collective
interpretive frameworks function in society.
His argument is similar to our earlier description of collective cognition as seemingly relative.
But Kuyper’s Christian worldview philosophy is
clearly based on a belief that there is a real creator,
God, who is objectively manifest in the material
creation as well as in the Bible. Both realms are
objectively true. But seeming relativity comes
into Kuyper’s thought when he claims that there
are different interpretations of that reality: “abnormal” and “normal,” as he termed them.35
Those who are regenerated by the power of God’s
Holy Spirit are given a new outlook, which allows them to understand that the cosmos is in
an abnormal state due to sin and in need of redemption through Jesus Christ, but those who
are unregenerate see all as normal and see the
need for Christ as folly. The result is a difference
in interpretation of a single reality, not a difference between two constructed realities that are
mutually exclusive.
One implication from Christian Worldview
philosophy is that God’s reality is the uber-framework—the true paradigm or schemata, the only
correct interpretation—and that human access
to the framework is only possible by regeneration of the Holy Spirit. The reverse implication is
that without God’s action, flawed frameworks or
wrong schemata, paradigms, or worldviews exist,
leading to framework errors at all levels.
Another implication is that because the Holy
Spirit’s regeneration focuses inwardly, we may
need to consider that our interpretive frameworks
are more than cognitive. Recently, some have begun to critique36 the idea of worldview as a static,
theoretical, and cognitive process and to direct
us to see our interpretive frameworks as coming
from the heart—which encompasses our identity
more holistically.37 For example, Jamie Smith
suggests that when talking about worldview, we
need to move to a more non-cognitive, affective
model, which includes our cares, concerns, motivations, and desires.38 Based upon insight from
Esther Meek,39 Naugle argues that “the heart
needs to be rooted in the physical body…and anchored in the ebb and flow of the real world,”40
20
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meaning that knowing with the heart, which is
the center of human consciousness, involves the
totality of our being. This is where our individual
cognitive schemata intermingle with our collective paradigms and worldviews and guide us in
holistic biological, psychological, and social consciousness.
Conclusion
The interpretive frameworks we have looked
at (cognitive schemata, paradigms, and worldviews) seem to all function in a common way—
as filters to help us understand the world around
us. This way of human perception seems to be by
design. God created us to gain individual and social knowledge through interpretive frameworks.
These frameworks provide a starting point as well
as an important heuristic for our exploration and
progress in fulfilling the cultural mandate.41
One aspect of this design is clear: there are
limitations. We are limited perceivers but will
someday be freed from at least part of the limitation. Human nature is restricted in that we are
creatures created by God and, as such, will never
apprehend fully the true uber-worldview, which
is known by God alone. We all are affected by the
distortion of sin, which implies that some of the
subjectivity of our cognitive perceptions is due to
sin. This distortion explains why errors happen at
all levels of our interpretive frameworks.
The Christian’s hope is that Christ’s redemptive work of restoration will yield for us a more
complete way of knowing at His second coming.
As the apostle Paul said, “Now I know in part;
then I shall know fully.” We have confidence that
part of the limitation in our ability to know will
be removed.
Perhaps without sin’s effect upon our interpretive frameworks, we may share a common
perceptual organization, language, culture, paradigm, and worldview. Having a shared interpretive framework seems consistent with the biblical theme of restoration. Recall that the origin
of multiple languages and culture groups came
from God’s judgment of sin at the Tower of
Babel. Perhaps God will bring “heart” and “cognitive” unity to all the diverse nations who occupy the new Jerusalem by establishing a common

set of interpretive frameworks for all its citizens.
The biblical narrative of creation, fall, redemption, and consummation is the human entrance
into God’s true worldview, the uber-framework,
where God’s people will know more fully, which
may mean to know in the same way from percept
to thought to culture. When that day arrives, we
all, including Anthony de Mello, will no longer
see and understand things as we were, but will
see and understand them as God intended, as
they truly are.
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